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1. Beginnings
Quantum Effects: What You Should Know The principle of a Wave Collapse Time Travel Device is obviously too well known to discuss in detail ...
Saturday, 23 January 2016
13: An object caught in a temporal loop
The two balls are identical. I suspected that handling the pristine ball inscribed by the stranger would result in an identical pattern of wear to the ball which arrived in the Loop. It didn't. The writing wore off in quite different places. I could only conclude that the object sent back in time was the one which arrived days before, so I chose that one. It faded from the apparatus on it's endless journey, forever caught in a time-like curve, and yet itself an artifact of the machinery from which it was engendered. An artifact, like the quantum froth, which borrows the entropy upon which it is created from its own destruction.
Tuesday, 19 January 2016
12: Please be careful
I have very good reason to believe that the unfortunate driver in this story is an American gentleman who purchased some parts from me, using the sobriquet of "Brad Gunn". I can quite see what he was trying to do, but he clearly didn't read the instructions carefully. I have clarified the section on 'relative velocity' to prevent any recurrence of this mishap.
http://metro.co.uk/2015/12/24/man-who-crashed-car-into-building-was-trying-to-time-travel-5583759/
http://metro.co.uk/2015/12/24/man-who-crashed-car-into-building-was-trying-to-time-travel-5583759/
Friday, 15 January 2016
11: Object Comparsion
The object is clearly a yellow pool ball. My first thought was that I had previously considered a billiard ball as a subject and while I do not own a billiard table, I do own a pool table. It struck me as rather odd that I should have chosen the yellow ball, of which there are many, as opposed to the white or black ball, which are singular. However, I pulled a yellow pool ball from the box in my garage and it appears to be identical to the specimen. Identical in every way. Under optical microscopy, every scuff, contour and scratch are the same. The only difference appears to be the enigmatic numbering, which is not by my own hand, unless I choose to disguise it in some way.
Undeterred, I ventured from my laboratory and accosted the first passer-by to meet my gaze, and prevailed upon him that he should write a 4 digit number of his own upon the ball. The result:
This differs from the ball which arrived only in the numbering, which is worn in places.
Undeterred, I ventured from my laboratory and accosted the first passer-by to meet my gaze, and prevailed upon him that he should write a 4 digit number of his own upon the ball. The result:
This differs from the ball which arrived only in the numbering, which is worn in places.
I
I asked myself why I chose the yellow ball to send back in time. I am not sure choice came into it.
Tuesday, 12 January 2016
10: Materialisation
An object, which I can only assume to be a retrograde test subject, has appeared in the Deutsch Loop apparatus.
9: Deutsch Loop Preparation
Here is the equipment for the Deutsch Loop experiment, set up and running awaiting the arrival in the present of the retrograde sample. Video is running, and I will be sure to post as soon as we have a successful result. You can see clearly the Josephson Coils, whose field should be quite strong enough for a reasonably large test object, and the Macroscopic Bose-Einstein Condensate.
Sunday, 3 January 2016
8: Quantum Suicide Confirmation Performed
This is a bit of a two pipe problem, to put it mildly. Statistical inference is not my speciality, so I may need to consult my good friend Cornelius on this matter. I can say that I have, to my satisfaction, performed the confirmation. My choice of death was not the customary revolver, but a much simpler device involving a number of transformers and everyday domestic mains electricity applied to the temples. In fact, there was no reason to introduce any paraphernalia such as unstable isotopes, far less military issue firearms. I simply had to assure myself that there was a way in which the wave-function of the electrons in the system could 'collapse' which would not result in my death, or injury Not as straightforward as it sounds. I devised a trip system on a parallel circuit which would prevent a non-lethal voltage, but of course the trip system was itself subject to quantum effects. In the end the apparatus was something of a fudge. It was possible that the system could deliver a devastating but non-lethal shock, but the odds of it doing so it a way that would leave me conscious were extremely low. In the end I was reasonably happy that the odds were as follows:
1: Death. Overwhelmingly likely.
2: No effect. Extremely unlikely.
3: Horrible injury. Much less likely than 2.
The probabilistic relationship between 2 and 3 was my only concern, and I was satisfied that in this respect the arrangement was 'safe' in that 3 was somewhere in the order of 1 to 10 million times less likely than 2. Note that 2 would also arise in the unlikely event of a waveform collapse which would result in a non-lethal shock, thus causing the failsafe to engage, whereas 3 would be the result of a non-lethal shock and a failure of the failsafe device.
Now, here is the rub. Say I am convinced that the confirmation was indeed successful. What should you the rational impartial observer believe? I would suggest that you should not believe me. In fact, I should say that your credence value should fall as mine increases, as follows.
Let us first say that the value r represents my reliabilty, from your point of view. This may be relatively high or low, but will be between 1 and 0. If you are simply reading this online, you may be very sceptical indeed, whereas if you have inspected my laboratory and met me in person, I should very much hope this value would be much higher. It is simply a numerical measure of the extent to which you trust me to carry out the experiment correctly and truthfully report the results. Whatever this value is, you have a prior credence value \(r_{1}\).
On the basis of my reported results, you should be able to rationally calculate a posterior credence value \(r_{2}\) using simple Bayesian reasoning; \(r_{2}\) is simply \(P (r|E)\) where E is the evidence, the successful completion of the confirmation. This is given by \[P(r|E)=\frac{P(r)P(E|r)}{P(E)}\]
Note that this case is quite different from normal scientific confirmation. Here, the strength of the evidence is directly related to its a priori improbabilty. As more iterations of the experiment are run, the more P(E|r) approaches 1 and P(E) approaches 0. Ultimately, anything is more likely than the fact that I have successfully conducted the experiment successfully: I must be lying or mistaken.
Furthermore, I must begin to doubt my own reliability, for like most scientists, I am always aware of the possibility that I have made a mistake. I lost count. The probability of the null hypothesis, that the sequence of non-death results is a result of chance, is now well over \(10^{^{100}}\). At this point in time, it occurs to me that it is far more likely that I am wrong in some way, that I simply cannot have carried out the experiment as I believe I have done. It also occurs to me that any sentient being in my position would draw the same conclusion, and that there could be that which is true, but any rational analysis must conclude is false. Of course, I could be wrong.
1: Death. Overwhelmingly likely.
2: No effect. Extremely unlikely.
3: Horrible injury. Much less likely than 2.
The probabilistic relationship between 2 and 3 was my only concern, and I was satisfied that in this respect the arrangement was 'safe' in that 3 was somewhere in the order of 1 to 10 million times less likely than 2. Note that 2 would also arise in the unlikely event of a waveform collapse which would result in a non-lethal shock, thus causing the failsafe to engage, whereas 3 would be the result of a non-lethal shock and a failure of the failsafe device.
Now, here is the rub. Say I am convinced that the confirmation was indeed successful. What should you the rational impartial observer believe? I would suggest that you should not believe me. In fact, I should say that your credence value should fall as mine increases, as follows.
Let us first say that the value r represents my reliabilty, from your point of view. This may be relatively high or low, but will be between 1 and 0. If you are simply reading this online, you may be very sceptical indeed, whereas if you have inspected my laboratory and met me in person, I should very much hope this value would be much higher. It is simply a numerical measure of the extent to which you trust me to carry out the experiment correctly and truthfully report the results. Whatever this value is, you have a prior credence value \(r_{1}\).
On the basis of my reported results, you should be able to rationally calculate a posterior credence value \(r_{2}\) using simple Bayesian reasoning; \(r_{2}\) is simply \(P (r|E)\) where E is the evidence, the successful completion of the confirmation. This is given by \[P(r|E)=\frac{P(r)P(E|r)}{P(E)}\]
Note that this case is quite different from normal scientific confirmation. Here, the strength of the evidence is directly related to its a priori improbabilty. As more iterations of the experiment are run, the more P(E|r) approaches 1 and P(E) approaches 0. Ultimately, anything is more likely than the fact that I have successfully conducted the experiment successfully: I must be lying or mistaken.
Furthermore, I must begin to doubt my own reliability, for like most scientists, I am always aware of the possibility that I have made a mistake. I lost count. The probability of the null hypothesis, that the sequence of non-death results is a result of chance, is now well over \(10^{^{100}}\). At this point in time, it occurs to me that it is far more likely that I am wrong in some way, that I simply cannot have carried out the experiment as I believe I have done. It also occurs to me that any sentient being in my position would draw the same conclusion, and that there could be that which is true, but any rational analysis must conclude is false. Of course, I could be wrong.
Friday, 1 January 2016
29: Happy New Year
I just thought I would pop back to wish myself and everyone else a very happy new year. Quite an eventful one it is, too.
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